Conclusions.
[Scholars, philosophers, and leaders of the world] have convinced themselves that man, the worst transgressor of all species, is the crown of creation. All other creatures were created merely to provide him with food, pelts, to be tormented, exterminated. In relation to them, all people are Nazis; for the animals it is an eternal Treblinka.
Isaac Bashevis Singer, ‘The Letter Writer’,
from The Seance and Other Stories.
In the first years of the twenty-first century, animal rights advocates undoubtedly have a most substantial task ahead of them if they aspire to seriously convince people that they act just like Nazis toward nonhuman animals. The evidence presented in this thesis suggests that, for the vast majority, analogies between the fate of the human Jews in World War II and the plight of contemporary nonhumans will be regarded as utterly mystifying and outrageous: outrage will undoubtedly descend upon social historian Charles Patterson whose recent book, Eternal Treblinka: Our treatment of animals and the Holocaust, dares to make this very comparison (Patterson 2002).
The sociology of human-nonhuman relations suggests that the philosophical foundations of Western ‘civilisation’ would disallow such an analogy. Both ancient philosophers and jurists declared that nonhuman animals are on earth for ‘us’. The philosophical challenge to such views is a relatively recent phenomenon, while the legal challenge is younger still, having occurred only in the last decade or so. Furthermore, the sociology of human-nonhuman relations reveals that longstanding cultural constructions rule out such unwarranted and unwelcome comparisons. Moreover, this study shows that the conventional societal orientation sympathetic to the moral orthodoxy concerning human-nonhuman relations would also find the correlation appalling if not rather silly. In this welfarist view, how can a modern commitment to the strict regulation of ‘humane treatment’ be compared with the grotesque details of Nazi atrocities? Sociological analysis highlights how daily social practice suggests that the analogy must, for most, be ridiculous nonsense. How could such a monstrous analogy apply to, say, ‘animal loving’ Britain? Don’t ‘we’ demonstrably care for animals? Don’t ‘we’ animal lovers weep if they get a disease or become ill?
However.
Given that the overarching theme of the present work has been engaged in identifying major social factors that create and maintain a speciesist orientation in human-nonhuman relations, then the evidence in the pages above suggests that the initially disturbing comparison with Nazism is not so far-fetched.
There has been a deliberate emphasis throughout this work on social process and processes, such as the socialisation processes. Understanding any society in which forms of exploitation are institutionalised, widely internalised, and seen as acceptable, is not to expect some demigod is present to charismatically suggest to all and sundry that this social attitude is to be favoured. Weber states that modern society becomes dominated by instrumental rationality over time. Societal attitudes and social practices evolve slowly over time, mediated by, and mediating, social norms and values which are shaped by sociopolitical and economic factors. The intention of this thesis throughout has been directed toward advancing the understanding of contemporary social attitudes concerning human-nonhuman relations. Examining firmly sedimented social belief about other animals this thesis serves to reveal how, by physically and systematically dominating and exploiting nonhumans for a range of instrumental and sentimental reasons, societies have sought to construct and maintain fundamental human superiority claims to justify both the socialised treatment of - and human views about - other animals.
As evidence presented here suggests, human-nonhuman relation claims are regarded as sufficiently meaningful, fixed and rudimentary even to the extent that individual human beings and whole communities can be conceptually stripped of their humanity; stripped, therefore, of the hope of being rightholders; stripped of being legal and social ‘persons’. When this occurs, when human beings as individuals or in groups are portrayed as mere ‘things’ just like nonhuman animals, then they are effectively placed in serious harm’s way. In effect, social orientations toward human-nonhuman relations can help end the alleged special protection humans are offered just by ‘being human’ (Bauman & May 2001: 75).
The preceding pages present evidence that methods exist – and are currently employed - that ‘reduce’ humans into ‘devalued’, ‘subhuman’, and ultimately ‘nonhuman’ categories. Clearly, in the social construction of other animals, ‘animal’ means ‘harmable’ or, more technically, nonhuman interests may be sacrificed to satisfy many human ones. Those who have exploited other human beings attempted to align individuals and groups alongside those already constructed as essentially existing to serve some human need or utilisation. Both dehumanisation and depersonalisation processes are regularly employed and organised in periods of war. They are systematically used in military training techniques, in many pornographic portrayals, and in general racist and sexist discourse. The processes employed rely heavily on widespread a-priori social understandings about nonhuman-human distinctions and associated moral worth. They draw on the various widespread social practices - Mason’s ‘rituals of dominionism’ - involving the human (mis)treatment of other animals, while maintaining the ideological message in which nonhumans occupy ‘natural’, or ‘God-given’, ‘devalued’, ‘lower-than’, and therefore ‘harmable’, ‘usable’, ‘exploitable’ and easily ‘killable’ categories of being.
Interrelated philosophy, theology, social practice, underlying ideology and social discourse serves as effective ‘constructors of sufficient difference’ which provides moral distance between humans and nonhumans. Indeed, over time humans seem to have often sought to mark any discernible differences, declare them as morally relevant, all in order to override the sentiency and subject-of-a-life status of billions of nonhumans, effectively undermining the evolutionary kinship between human animals and nonhuman ones.
Jasper (1999: 77) correctly suggests that modern humans hold on to the two exploitative orientations towards other animals. Both have been discussed in this thesis. The first orientation involves the qualified acceptance of the instrumental use of other animals as resources, while the other utilisation is mainly sentimental, although this second category seems also to contain a good deal of its own instrumental intent. Added to dominant non-animal rights philosophical and theological positions with regard to nonhuman animals and human beings, the self-serving and economically-driven ‘pro-use’ arguments seeking to maintain profitable orientations towards the moral status quo are encountered. Such groups, as seen in Guither’s work, have their own financial justifications for the continuation of the human exploitation of nonhuman animals.
As indicated above, substantial parts of this thesis have emphasised the vital ‘maintenance’ role played by the lifelong socialisation processes in the preservation of present attitudes about the ethical status of both human and nonhuman beings. While on-going and day-to-day experience bolster societywide orientations toward other animals, the professional socialisation of those whose livelihoods and identities are bound up with various forms of ‘using’ other animals provides this group with further incentives to support current welfarist conceptualisations of human-nonhuman relations. In the light of factors such as these, any sociological analysis cannot ignore overarching consequences of individuals - the vast majority in most modern societies - being socialised as ideological and practising speciesists. In a culture that routinely exploits other animals, the phrase ‘they know not what they do’ can be properly applied to its children. Daily, they experience beings they meet as meat; or know them as playthings and as personal or family possessions. In a great many aspects of their social learning, children are socialised from their earliest years within an overarching and deeply speciesist ideology to accept the human use of other animals in all its forms. The significance of this for animal rights advocates is clear. As Bauman has indicated, the simplest thing people do with regard to core social values is abide by them; indeed, just as many Nazis and Germans did. Since this is exactly what the unreflexive majority does with regard to dominant social values about human-nonhuman relations, supporters of animal rights must understand that their own personal transcendence of orthodox attitudes are exceptions to a widely kept rule. Most people, quite simply, ‘go with the flow’. Perhaps the degree to which animal advocates are thought to have broken away from prevailing ideology about human-nonhuman relations can be seen reflected in the extent to which animal welfarism remains a part of the animal protection movement’s central claims making relating to the treatment of other animals by human beings.
A full appreciation of the magnitude of the task before animal advocates, assuming a commitment to public education strategies rather than to the more militant examples of ‘direct action’, requires – in part at least, an acknowledgement of answers to the research questions posed throughout this thesis. Clearly spelt out in the pages above, described step-by-step, are elements of the construction and maintenance systems both creating and sustaining societywide speciesist social attitudes. The prevalence of various ‘us’ and ‘them’ categories, and the social construction of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ are seen to further the aims of the racist, the sexist, the homophobe and so on. Such categorical distinctions, however, are seen to be somewhat dependent on core speciesist attitudes, as Bauman indicates. There are social attitudes that feed into and rely upon orthodox views of nonhuman animals and conventional perceptions about human-nonhuman relations.
These attitudes that are built on and plug into firm social understandings of human supremacy claims, the significance of the ‘species barrier’, and the harmful uses which the notion of ‘the barrier’ accommodates. To the extent that exploitative relations among human beings are facilitated by dehumanisation processes, findings in this thesis suggest that opponents of such exploitation and advocates of human rights need to acknowledge central speciesist conceptualisations when humans exploit, harm, and kill each other as well as other ‘others’.
Human societies reveal their misothery by objectifying other animals, commodifying them, making them items of various types of consumption, retaining them as items of property and ‘legal things’ by law. In society, if humans ‘damage’ a nonhuman animal, including killing him or her, they may find themselves accused and charged with causing ‘criminal damage’; that is, causing damage to the ‘animal property’ of another human being. As with once legal forms of human slavery, such social forces maintain exploitative relations. These are further aspects of a speciesist world into which the young are routinely socialised and, therefore, children learn the norms and values of animal hating and animal loving societies. Into largely misotherous cultures most people are thrust: cast into societies that continually underlines the ideology that ‘‘Man’ is king’.
A world that remains characterised by racism and sexism declares over and over again that everything that exists in the world exists for human beings: each and everything other than fellow humans are ‘resources for the use of’.
Language reveals how humans hate and love other animals and animal life, as they continue to use traditional human-nonhuman orientations to maintain unequal human relations. It has been shown that to call someone an ‘animal’ is to confer upon them a truly negative label: human serial killers are not human according to the popular press: they cannot be allowed the glory of the label ‘human’, so they are named ‘animals’ instead. Such people, after all, ‘behave like animals’. Societies reserve this tag for the cruellest people they can think of. Mason says this is because modern humans see nonhuman animals and nature as vicious, base, and contemptible.
As shown in virtually every section of the present thesis, none of the above contradicts any of the principal premises of orthodox animal welfarism. Indeed, the foregone merely affirms for many the absolute need for the normative regulatory role of animal welfare practice and enforcement. Ideological animal welfarism reinforces the idea that theologians and philosophers were and are correct to construct a ‘ladder of being’ as a ‘natural’ order because no substantial bad should result from it. Indeed, much good accrues for both humans and nonhuman animals in present relations. A product of on-going and thoroughly institutionalised social processes, integral to humanity’s ‘agri-culture’, is the apparent difficulty that animal rights positions seem to have in their ability to challenge the settled orthodox views about the relations between humans and other animals. At the present time, and despite of (or because of) more than thirty years of rhetorical ‘animal rights’ advocacy in Britain, the conventional orthodoxy of animal welfarism continues to adequately provide for the vast majority a secure, multi-purpose, and apparently ever adaptable ideological framework supporting the prevailing industrialised systems of animal exploitation and other modes of animal ownership. Animal welfarism helps to preserve rather than expose or seriously question the exploitative rationality that firmly sediments both conventional instrumental and sentimental attitudes about nonhuman animals.
Taking an ‘insider’s’ view of the animal protection movement for a moment, it seems to be clear that rights views are presently engaged in a discursive relationship with orthodox positions both inside and outside the animal protection movement. Yet animal welfarism is so firmly entrenched, and so widespread and customary, that it appears that even many rights supporters have regular difficulty expressing, articulating and advocating the full animal rights - or any largely non-welfarist - agenda. As far as the latter point goes, of course, reluctance to advocate the whole ‘rights agenda’ has been traditionally seen in the animal movement as the result of strategic choices and issues of ‘framing’ (Yates 1998). However, this reluctance can also be seen as a reflection of the way animal welfarism succeeds in presenting rights views as views that go beyond those that are necessary for the well-being of nonhuman animals. A central ‘difficulty’ for rights views stems from the fact that the resilient orthodox outlook has preserved its authoritative ability to present its own position as entirely ‘normal’, ‘reasonable’, ‘rational’, and the self-evidently ‘correct’ perspective by which any reasonable person ought to evaluate human-nonhuman relations. For this reason, as seen in the present work to some extent, the orthodox position becomes the easy, confident, ‘non-extreme’ (and now more than ever, ‘non-terrorist’) means by which journalists, commentators, the majority of animal advocates, pro-use advocates and politicians talk about the treatment of nonhuman animals by humans.
*****
From the outset, it was to be expected that the ideology of animal welfarism would figure strongly throughout this thesis. That said, its utter centrality to virtually every level of discourse about human-nonhuman relations is surprising. Whether exploring philosophical and theological accounts, pro-use statements, political pronouncements, economic dimensions, or journalistic orientations, animal welfarism appears solidly entrenched as the significant defining and discursive factor. It is not a bewilderment, therefore, to discover that the limited number of rights-aware contributors to recent animal email networks appear to appreciate more than ever that forms of animal welfarism can seem to stand as serious impediments to the articulation, advocacy, and realisation of genuine animal rights aspirations.
In a thoroughly frustrating way, animal welfarism seems to amount to a barrier or filter which effectively prevents, or at least serves to mediate, the public rendition of a genuine animal rights philosophy. Animal welfarism appears as a fog in which rights discourse regularly becomes lost, misrepresented and redirected. Animal rights advocates who wish to test the societal reception of their own views of human-nonhuman animals are apparently hindered at every turn by a deeply internalised welfarist consciousness in most of the audiences they seek to influence.
Over and above the prevalence of these continuing social realities, it can surely be of no surprise (and of little comfort to any social movement advocate) that many people are effectively afforded useful methods of ‘message avoidance’ and evasion. Indeed, this thesis outlines some of the sociological and social psychological evidence that suggests that a general evasive orientation can effectively shield a great many so-called ‘postmodern’ men and women from engagement in numerous social and political issues related or not with nonhuman animals and notions of animal rights. However, in relation to the treatment of other animals, it seems that institutionalised animal welfarism can assist in the process of the avoidance of authentic animal rights views. In other words, it is entirely feasible that those who wish to largely evade rights messages while not wanting to be seen as doing anything unwarranted toward many nonhumans find the certainty and centrality of traditional animal welfarism a comforting place of refuge. Given that welfarism is the ‘obvious’ lens for assessing human-nonhuman relations, it is possible to demonstrate socially-approved concern for other animals (the sentimental orientation) while effectively side-stepping ‘extreme’ abolitionist rights positions. Animal welfarism provides society with a remarkable means by which nonhuman animals can be used, killed, or owned - or in other ways exploited by humans - while simultaneously maintaining a persuasive ideological stance that declares that British society in particular is dotty about animals and nonhuman care.
Such a welfarist orientation simply would not be tenable in terms of human rights issues. If it were, groups such as Amnesty International may be found funding experiments on humans to discover ‘welfare-friendly’ methods of imprisonment and torture. Moreover, an orientation towards a ‘human welfare movement’ based on the animal welfare model would presumable result in ‘free-range’ equivalents of child pornography based on production involving no ‘unnecessary’ suffering or harm to those so used. Regan asks (1988) whether a human rights campaigner who declares an absolute opposition to rape, child abuse, sexual discrimination and the abuse of the elderly would be seen as holding an ‘extremist’ position. Regan states that, ‘the plain fact is, moral truth often is extreme, and must be, for when injustice is absolute, then one must oppose it - absolutely’.
Finally, Future Possibilities and Directions.
One relatively ‘new strand’ that has emerged within the evolution of ‘animal rights’ thinking in recent years has been the still growing academic interest in the issue. Some of this work may prove to be very important in the history of ‘animal rights’ thinking; and its importance is recognised in recent works by philosopher-advocates such as Regan and Ryder.
For, while many animal activists adopt a commendable ‘campaign now, philosophise later’ stance (take note, critical theorists), it is important, and also strategically necessary, that there is some evaluation, exploration and serious analysis of the development of the animal protection movement and its philosophy (and, perhaps in the light of this thesis, its relationship with forms of animal welfarism). Current ‘cutting-edge’ animal rights theorists include Francione and Hall whose vital contribution to animal advocacy at the present time is to attempt to maintain an emphasis on the overall meaning and consequences of real animal rights thinking. This is thinking and advocacy which can so easily be dismissed as extreme and unnecessary; a position most difficult to espouse given the continuing pre-eminence of animal welfare ideology and practice. Future research may be beneficial to aid the further elaboration of the precise meaning and range of animal rights thought, continuing to inspire the current discourse about the social construction of notions such as ‘the property status of nonhuman animals’; ‘personhood’; campaigning pragmatism and campaigning fundamentalism; and yes, the fraught relationship between animal welfarism and animal rights.
Appendix 1.
Email about attitudes to nonhuman animals.
Date: Tue, 3 Aug 1999 15:06:15 -0700 (PDT)
From: CZ.
To: sop044@bangor.ac.uk
Subject: more attitudes to animals
Dear Roger
Further to yesterday's email, you might like to read the following, it is very indicative of mainstream attitudes to “food” animals...i.e. they are not animals.
Some months back I was with two colleagues from London Animal Action. We had set up a stall at Angel Islington, complete with posters and leaflets. Whenever people stopped to sign our petitions we invited them to help themselves to as many leaflets as they wanted. About the time when school knocked off, we had a number of schoolgirls (about 13 - 15
years) signing. One group of about 4 started talking to us, yes, they loved animals, and yes, it was cruel to put them in laboratories, circuses etc.
They took a few leaflets, then one noticed the leaflet entitled “Eating Animals.”
“Oh, look, some people eat animals. How gross.”
“You’re vegetarian or vegan, are you?” I asked.
“No. I’m not vegetarian,” the one replied.
“Then you eat animals, too.”
“Of course I don’t. But I’m not vegetarian,” she said.
“But, if you're not a vegetarian, then that means you eat animals. Vegetarianism means not eating animals,” I persisted.
“No, I wouldn’t eat animals, that’s disgusting.”
“Then you must be a vegetarian.”
“No, I’m not. I eat meat, but I don’t eat animals.”
By this time my two friends were listening to this, quite astounded.
“Well, let’s put it this way,” I said. “Do you eat hamburgers and things?”
“Yes, of course I do. We all do. But they’re not made out of animals.”
“What do you think that lump of mince meat is in the middle of the bun?”
“Lamb or cow, or something, I guess.”
“Right,” I said. “And what are lambs and cows? They’re animals!”
“No they’re not,” the girls chorused. “They’re not proper animals. Animals are cats and dogs and things like that.”
“No,” I said. “Animals are cows and lambs and pigs as well.”
“Oh, no,” the first one said. “You can’t count them as animals. They’re just things that taste good.”
They went off with various leaflets, but didn't take the ones on vegetarianism/veganism. They could not acknowledge that they ate animals, real, proper animals that is.
That’s what we’re up against, Roger.
However, one glimmer of hope. I still think the future for animals lies in educating the young, and to that end I will be going into schools representing VIVA!, in order to teach children the happiness and health there is to be had when one desists from eating animals. Viva is having a training day on 18 September, unfortunately that is the day of a Hillgrove national demo, so I had to make a choice, and I see children as a long-term investment.
Regards
CZ
Appendix 2.
Books for children and young adults consulted for the socialisation section of this thesis and not used in the main text.
Our Pets by Ed Catherall, Hove: Wayland (1985).
‘Science is Fun’ Series.
For age: 10.
This book features topics such as ‘My Pet’ and ‘Your Friends Pets’ etc., with appropriate questions. For example, in the ‘My Pet’ section (p. 4), the text asks, ‘What sort of pet do you have?’ In a piece about ‘Pet Food’ (p. 7), the children are asked, ‘Which pet food advertisements can you remember?’ In ‘Pet Shows’ (p. 15), the author asks, ‘Have you ever entered your pet in a pet show?’, and suggests that children, ‘Arrange your own pet show’ including categories such as, ‘The Happiest Pet’, ‘The Most Obedient Pet’[1] or ‘The Cleverest Pet’. In ‘Training Pets’ (p. 16), Catherall inquires, ‘What is your pet trained to do?’ and ‘What are your friends training their pets to do?’
In ‘Trained Animals’ (p. 18), the reader is asked whether she has ‘seen circus animals?’ ‘What tricks could the animals do?’ is the next question, followed by the most potentially ‘animal rights’ question: ‘How do you think these animals were trained?’ The text (p. 19) recommends that children visit a zoo to ‘see how the animals are kept’, and asks the question: ‘Do they live like they would in the wild?’
By page 23 Catherall is wanting to know ‘Which pets are for sale in your local pet shop?’ and ‘which pet would you most like to own?’
Animals at Work by Robin and Jacelyn Wild, London: Heinman (1973).
This book is essential set up as a historical account of how other animals came to ‘work’ for human beings. The authors imply that a form of social contract exists between humans and nonhumans within a framework of animal welfarism: ‘Think of how much we have gained from the hard work animals have done for us so patiently through the years. They still work for us and still give us great pleasure. In return we should look after them and treat them well’ (p. 46).
Stories include accounts of how earlier foragers came across young animals when gathering food and subsequently introduced them into human families (p. 9). Farmers are said have benefitted through a cooperative relationship with wild cats who ‘came to eat the rats and mice’ on their farms (p. 15).
As well as their ‘peacetime work’ undertaken ‘for men’, animals also work for humans during times of war. The authors state that ‘no animal has fought for us more often than the horse’ (p. 28). Page 32 tell the story of bats in WWII who were part of a ‘secret plan’ to attack the enemy. Each bat was to be fitted with a small time bomb in a harness. After being dropped over enemy territory by parachute, the bats were expected the make for local buildings, chew through their harnesses, flay away and leave the bombs to explode!
The Wilds go on to tell their readers (p. 38) that ‘both children and grown-ups enjoy watching animals do tricks. Explaining that performing bears used to be a common sight as they were ‘taken around from place to place for people to watch their clumsy imitation of a dance’, the authors note that it is still possible to see performing dogs at Punch and Judy shows and circuses still have ‘the troupe of beautiful horses trotting round the circus ring or the snarling lions that jump through hoops of fire. Even fleas can be taught to do tricks!’
About Some Animals That Work For Us by Melvin John Uhl, Watford: Frederick Muller (1966).
Uhl tells the story of ‘early man’s’ domestication of animals. Dogs were probably the first to be trained, he says, and as people came to trust dogs they probably ‘learned to love them as well. No doubt they felt the same way about their dogs that you do about yours’ (p. 4) and luckily, ‘a dog will try to do almost anything in order to be loved by its master’ (p. 40). Because there were no shops or butchers in those days, Uhl goes on, men had to hunt animals for food and other animals were trained to help them (p. 5).
On page 8 Uhl declares that, ‘You probably think of your cat as nothing more than a pet’. However, cats have ‘been working for man for many, many years’. Turning to ‘animal helpers’ in far-away countries, the author states that the mongoose is easily trained as a pest controller but they could not be introduced to Britain because ‘if allowed to run wild, they would eat the farmer’s chickens, turkeys, and othe fowl in addition to the rats’ (p. 13).
‘Man’ is on safer ground with Oxen, who are ‘among man’s oldest known helpers’ (p. 30) and is strong like the water buffalo who is big yet easy to train (p. 33) in contrast to the difficult in training elephants (p. 28).
Domesticated Animals by Bertha Morris Parker & W.S. Weichert, Exeter: Wheaton (1963).
On p. 3 on this book, the authors ask children to ‘imagine yourself being forced to get meat to eat by hunting such animals as bear and deer with a rough stone axe. The text says that foragers may take ‘all day’ to find enough food. P. 4 states that ‘man’ could tame existing wild animals if necessary. However, ‘those tamed long ago serve our purposes so well that animal breeders give little thought to other wild animals that they might domesticate’. On p. 35, the authors give some evidence on being well ahead of future genetic modifiers of other animals - or at least they talk about selective breeding: ‘There are doubtless other hybrid possibilities. Some of them are sure to be developed if and when man sees a need for them’.
Animals at Work by Edward Ramsbottom & Jason Redmayne, London: Macmillan Education (1977).
Aimed at very young children.
P. 4 introduces children to police dogs. ‘Here is Rex’, the text says, ‘catching a thief’. ‘Pretend Rex is your dog. Write a story of an exciting adventure you have together’.
Animals That Help Us. The Story of Domestic Animals by Carroll Lane Fenton & Herminie B. Kitchen, London: Dobson (1963).
On p. 18 Fenton & Kitchen tell children about social class relationships around AD900, ‘laws decreed that only nobles and gentlemen might keep greyhounds for hunting. Common people who lived around forests were allowed to keep sheep dogs and certain pet dogs. But anyone who owned a large dog, such as a hound or mastiff, had to make it lame by cutting tendons in its ‘knees’. This kept it from chasing the nobleman’s deer’.
P. 123 says that, ‘Elephants also have good-sized brains. The brain of a 4-ton elephant weighs almost 10 pounds, which is more than 3 times as much as the brain of a human being. But the elephant’s brain is not as good as ours, and it cannot think nearly as well’.
Slugs by David Greenberg, London: Pepper Press (1983).
More than half of this book is spent on ways people could harm slugs - usually by eating them in various ways (covering them with chocolate, for example, to serve as sweets). However, there are other ways suggested: ‘Sizzle them on light bulbs’ (p. 8), ‘Dissect a slug with scissors, Poke one with a tweezer, Pop one in the microwave, Freeze one in the freezer’ (p. 9). ‘Drop one in a blender’ (p. 11). ‘Slick a Slug with Super Glue’ (p. 13). ‘Roast ‘em, Toast ‘em, Stew ‘em, Chew ‘em, Dump ‘em in your mother’s bath, Ask her to shampoo ‘em’ (p. 18). ‘Tie one to a bottle rocket, Lauch it, Zappo, Zingo!, Shoot one from a slingshot, Through a neighbour’s window’ (p. 22). The last few pages feature suggestions about what giant slugs might do to you, ending with the words: ‘Then they’ll stuff you a barbage can, And Leave you overnight, And after how you’ve treated Slugs, It surely serves you right!’ (p. 31).
Appendix 3.
The Times, Thu 8 July 1999:
Animal rights protest at Pamplona bull-run
==============================
For the first time animal rights activists protested against the annual running of the bulls in Pamplona as an American-funded group attempted to take the glamour out of an event made famous by Ernest Hemingway's novel “The Sun Also Rises”.
The small group of American and British-led protesters raised their banners just before six fighting bulls were let loose to chase hundreds of runners, many wearing typical red and white
costumes, down the northern Spanish city’s narrow cobbled streets to the bullring on the first day of the annual eight-day San Fermin fiesta.
The international campaign against the bull-run included the placing of advertisements in American newspapers and running television advertisements on specialist travel channels.
It urged the thousands of young Americans, Canadians, Australians and Britons who follow Hemingway's route to Pamplona every year to boycott the San Fermin festival.
“Even Hemingway himself acknowledged the cruelty and tragedy of the bullfight,” said Andrew Butler, spokesman for the American-based People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals organisation, which led the protest.
But Hemingway fans, including hundreds of young Americans who each year treat the bull-run as a rite of passage into manhood, prefer to remember Hemingway as one of the greatest admirers of both the bullfight and of the San Fermin fiesta.
Yesterday’s protesters said they had been warned by local anti-bullfight activists not to protest at the site of the bull run as the runners could have turned violent. “It would not have been the first time that violence against bulls has been turned against people,” Mr Butler said.
However, the protest was largely ignored by the hundreds of runners whose minds were fixed on the dangers of the half-mile dash along the often slippery cobbled streets.
Yesterday’s run resulted in several injuries and two local people were taken to hospital though neither was in a serious condition. A total of 13 people have died in the bull-runs since 1924.
The anti-bull protest came as Pamplona itself was busy paying homage to Hemingway ahead of the centenary of his birth on July 21.
-------------------
Appendix 4.
From sop044@bangor.ac.uk Mon Feb 28 13:59:07 2000
Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2000 16:48:54 +0000 (GMT)
Subject: Meat Eaters Survey.
1. Can you in a sentence or two explain why you eat meat?
· I was brought up eating meat so I don't know what it's like not to eat it. (besides, I hate fruit & vegetables!!).
· Because I like it, and in moderation I like to get some meat in my diet each week, usually white meat. for the same reason I eat loads of fruit. So for health and liking reasons.
· Meat is a good source of fibre, protein and minerals which the body needs on a daily basis to maintain growth and general health
· I have a problem with food (psychological problem causes convulsions of stomach and throat) and do not like many thing and so have a limited diet. Animal meat/products are the best single source of protein to help me keep a balanced diet (possibly just the lazy option?)
· Because it tastes nice, and I’m not too keen on a lot of vegetables
· It’s tasty, and you don't have to be so picky when you shop.
· It’s natural, survival of the fittest, we’re at the top of the food chain.
2. How would you respond to the argument that humans have no right to eat other animals?
· Humans have been eating other animals since the dawn of time. If it was so bad and wrong, wouldn't someone, somewhere have stopped it along the way?
· I would say that if we are talking morals then no we don't have any rights. But most meat eaters don't consider it to be a moral issue. The argument from nature. Its natural, we are omnivores, and we eat other animals just as other animals either eat or are eaten. Its not about rights, its just about survival. Whether or not the survival argument is relevant in western society today is another issue.
· Humans are themselves fundamentally classified as animals, and since in nature animals prey on other animals for food, it is therefore logical that humans should follow this example. Although, in my opinion the techniques of large output farming are questionable - at least in their natural surroundings, when animals are hunted down as a food source, they are given a fighting chance.
· Given my faith I try to follow the teachings of the bible and in there is the separation of man from the animals, and our authority to use them as a source of food. Although this is no justification to be cruel to them and make them suffer, and abuse them for the benefit of man in ways other than for food. Also man by design (teeth, eye position, digestive system etc.) is suited to a carnivorous (of at least omnivorous) existence and a lot of organisation and planning etc. is required to get a balanced diet without eating animal meat/products (or does it ?). Could a vegetarian/vegan have survived in the past ?
· Try getting a lion to eat a nut-roast!
· Who says
· There's nothing wrong with it as long as the animals are treated OK (i.e. free range and quick death, with short transport).
*****
[from the single vegetarian respondent].
Hey, this is actually a subject on which I DO have an opinion !!
Although perhaps my answers aren't appropriate to the questions !
1. Can you in a sentence or two explain why you eat meat?
· I don't eat meat. I've not done so for over 7 years. Why do I not eat meat ? well, I guess superficially it's simply a healthier lifestyle choice. But a more meaningful answer would be a belief in Buddhist philosophy re: transmigration of souls, and the compassion for all living things.
· But when I did eat meat, I did so purely because of tradition. Raised on meat and two veg, it was a subliminal habit.
2. How would you respond to the argument that humans have no right to
eat other animals?
· From a spiritual view point we have no right to take a life. But spirituality is all about enhancing your inner self, becoming a "better" person. For some people that is a luxury. When food is scarce, we cannot judge people for killing to survive. It’s the nature of things. I live a privileged life where I have a choice. The supermarkets are full of fruit and vegetables, not only can I satisfy my needs quite easily.
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